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Abstract 
Information is the most critical asset of modern organizations, and 
accordingly coveted by adversaries. When highly sensitive data is involved, 
an organization may resort to air-gap isolation, in which there is no 
networking connection between the inner network and the external world. 
While infiltrating an air-gapped network has been proven feasible in recent 
years (e.g., Stuxnet), data exfiltration from an air-gapped network is still 
considered to be one of the most challenging phases of an advanced cyber-
attack.  
In this paper we present "AirHopper", a bifurcated malware that bridges 
the air-gap between an isolated network and nearby infected mobile phones 
using FM signals. While it is known that software can intentionally create 
radio emissions from a video display unit, this is the first time that mobile 
phones are considered in an attack model as the intended receivers of 
maliciously crafted radio signals. We examine the attack model and its 
limitations, and discuss implementation considerations such as stealth and 
modulation methods. Finally, we evaluate AirHopper and demonstrate how 
textual and binary data can be exfiltrated from physically isolated computer 
to mobile phones at a distance of 1-7 meters, with effective bandwidth of 13-
60 Bps (Bytes per second).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Modern organizations rely on their computer networks to deliver all kinds 
of information. Consequently, such networks are a lucrative target for 
malicious adversaries. Defending a network is quite a complicated task, 
involving host-level protection, network-level protection, secured gateways 
and routers, and so on. However, as long as the local area network has a 
connection with the outer world (e.g., the Internet), irrespective of the level 
of protection, an innovative and persistent attacker will eventually find a way 
to breach the network, to eavesdrop, and to transmit sensitive data outward. 
Accordingly, when a network is used to deliver highly sensitive data, or to 
connect computers that store or process such data, the so called 'air gap' 
approach is often applied. In an air-gapped network, there is no physical 
networking connection (wired or wireless) with the external world, either 
directly or indirectly through another, less secure network. Nevertheless, 
employees may carry their mobile phones around the organization's 
workplace, possibly within the vicinity of a classified computer which is part 
of an air-gapped network. This may occur despite reasonable security 
procedures, and does not require malicious intent on the employee's part.  
This scenario becomes relevant and increasingly common since a growing 
portion of modern mobile phones are being marketed with FM radio receivers 
[1] [2] [3]. With appropriate software, compatible radio signals can be 
produced by a compromised computer, utilizing the electromagnetic radiation 
associated with the video display adapter. This combination, of a transmitter 
with a widely used mobile receiver, creates a potential covert channel that is 
not being monitored by ordinary security instrumentation. 
In this paper we show how mobile phones with FM receivers can be used 
to collect emanating radio signals, modulated with sensitive information, 
from a compromised computer. Although the attack model is somewhat 
complicated, it is not beyond the capabilities of a skilled persistent attacker. 
In reward for his or her effort, the attacker may collect valuable information 
from air-gapped networks. 
 
1.1  FM Receiver in Mobile Phones 
 
FM radio receivers in mobile phones, first introduced around 1998, have 
grown in popularity with the emergence of modern smartphones. Overriding 
early hesitations, most major carriers and manufacturers are integrating FM 
receivers in their products. Microsoft has endorsed FM, announcing support 
in an update to Windows Phone 8 [4]. Of the nearly 700 million phones sold 
by Nokia in 2012 and 2013, the two bestselling models (Lumia 520 and 
Lumia 920) now support FM radio. In the Android market, over 450 models 
support FM radio [1] [2]. FM receivers are also integrated in many feature 
phones (low-end mobile phones) and media players (e.g., iPod nano). 
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Additionally, legislative efforts have been made in the US to enforce 
integration of FM receivers in mobile phones, for use in emergency situations 
[5] . 
 
2. Attack Model 
 
The attack model posits that hostile code can be installed and run (a) on the 
targeted network, consisting of one computer or more and (b) on mobile 
devices that may reside in the vicinity of the targeted system. With the current 
popularity of 'Bring Your Own Device' (BYOD), mobile phones are often 
carried into and out of the physical perimeter of the organization. 
The attack is composed of four main steps: (1) inserting hostile code into 
the target system; (2) infecting mobile phones with hostile code; (3) 
establishing a Command and Control (C&C) channel with the mobile phone; 
(4) detecting emanated signals and transmitting them back to the attacker 
(Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Demonstration of AirHopper. The targeted computer (A) emanates 
radio signals that are picked up by a mobile phone (B).  In this 
demonstration, the distance between (A) and (B) is 4 meters. 
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2.1  Infecting the Target Machine 
 
Once the air gap barrier is breached, hostile code can infect systems within 
the targeted network. Such breaches are possible, as demonstrated by Stuxnet 
[6] [7] and Agent.btz [8]. It would be reasonable to assume that most similar 
cases are unpublished.  Possible attack vectors are (a) through removable 
media or (b) through outsourced software or hardware components. Once the 
hostile code runs on one node of the target network, it may propagate further 
and infect other nodes. 
 
2.2  Infecting the Mobile Phone 
 
Regarding mobile phones, the array of attack vectors is considerably wider 
than those target computers offer since these devices are connected to the 
outer world through a host of interfaces, such as cellular networks, Bluetooth, 
Wi-Fi, and physical connections to other devices. Most probably, the attacker 
would try to locate and infect mobile phones of those employees in the 
targeted organization, who are most likely to work in the vicinity of targeted 
computers. Similar to the early stage of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), 
this step may utilize data mining, social networks, phishing and similar social 
engineering methods. The mobile phone can be infected via the Internet, by 
visiting contaminated sites, by email messages with malicious attachments, 
or by installing malicious applications. Other infection routes include 
physical access, SMS vulnerabilities [9], and interference with the signaling 
interface [10]. 
 
2.3  Establishing the C&C Channel 
 
After infecting the mobile phone, the attacker should establish a C&C 
channel. This can be done via the Internet (data or Wi-Fi), or by SMS, where 
messages can be sent and received without alerting the user. If suitable 
connectivity with the attacker is limited or discontinuous, the malicious 
program that runs on the mobile phone may store the accumulated 
information, and send it back to the attacker when the desired connection is 
available. 
 
2.4  Radio Monitoring 
 
The mobile phone should monitor the radio channel in order to detect 
emanated information. When an emanated broadcast is detected, the device 
decodes it. Monitoring may be: (1) continuous as long as the mobile phone is 
active; (2) temporal, based on the work schedule of the user; (3) spatial, based 
on the current location of the user, as indicated by GPS, wireless network 
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cells, or otherwise; or (4) initiated upon receiving a remote command through 
the C&C channel. 
 
3. Background 
 
Generating radio signals from video card has been discussed in several 
works and technical papers [11] [12] [13] [14]. The main parameter required 
for transmission calculation is the pixel clock. The pixel clock is measured in 
MHz, and it represents the frequency at which the pixels are transmitted to 
screen such that a full frame of pixels fits within one refresh cycle. It can be 
calculated with a simple multiplication: 
 
(Hpixel + Hsync)(Vpixel + Vsync)(Rr) = PC 
 
where Hpixel and Vpixel are vertical and horizontal resolution (e.g., 1024 
and 768) settings, Vsync, Hsync are the vertical and horizontal synchronization 
length (in pixels) , Rr is the refresh rate (e.g., 60Hz) and PC is the pixel clock. 
These parameters are determined by the display standard. Generally, in both 
analog and digital standards, pixels timing is mainly determined by the 
display resolution and refresh rates. 
Given the graphic card standards, it is possible to construct an image 
pattern that while being sent to the display will generate a carrier wave 
modulated with a data signal. The first option is to directly affect the voltage 
of the signal by changing pixel colors. Amplitude modulation (AM) is the 
obvious choice for data transmission of this type. By gradually changing the 
shade of the pixels over a fixed carrier the amplitude of the carrier signal can 
be changed. Previous research has demonstrated intentional generation of 
modulated radio signals using monitors and display adapters [15] [12] [14] . 
The purpose of our research is to transmit FM signals which will be received 
and interpreted by mobile phone FM receiver. FM signals are generated by 
constructing an image of alternating sequences of black and white pixels that 
reflect the required carrier frequency modulation. In FM modulation, white 
and black pixels are used to generate fixed, maximal amplitude for stronger 
signal generation.  
 
4. Implementation 
 
For the purpose of testing and evaluating the realistic applicability of the 
attack, we developed the "AirHopper" malware. In this section, we describe 
the implementation of the malware's two components; a transmitter 
implemented for the PC and a receiver implemented for the mobile phone.  
Reception of the generated signals with a mobile phone's FM receiver 
poses new challenges and opportunities. One of the main challenges is the 
fact that FM-receiver chips in mobile phones are decoding the FM signals in 
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DSP (Digital Signal Processing) chips and then generating audio signals. 
Consequently, the mobile phone's operating system has access only to the 
generated audio output (layer 2, in Figure 2) and not to carrier waves 
themselves. Hence, in order to send digital information to receiver, data has 
to be modulated using audio tones (layer 3, in Figure 2). In addition, the audio 
frequencies used in modulations were selected given the FM receiver 
characteristics and limitations, as mentioned in section 4.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: AirHopper modulation layers 
 
4.1  FM Audio Signal Generation 
 
In this section we describe the algorithm used by AirHopper to generate 
pixels pattern (image) that cause emission of specific FM audio tone.  For the 
purpose of the audio modulation algorithm, we denote 𝐹𝑐 to be the carrier 
frequency which the FM receiver must be tuned to in order to receive the 
transmission (e.g. 90 MHz). This value is limited to be twice the pixel clock 
at most [15]. However, since the signal generated by the display adapter is 
nearly square (alternating between "black" and "white" pixels), it generates 
strong harmonics which may be used to ignore this limitation and transmit on 
a frequency higher than twice the pixel clock with some loss of signal quality 
[15]. 
𝐹𝑑 denotes the data frequency (audio tone) to be modulated over the carrier. 
𝑃𝑐 denotes the value of the pixel clock previously described and 𝐻𝑝, 𝑉𝑝 are the 
horizontal and vertical resolution parameters, plus the front and back porches 
which are periods of time in which no displayed pixel data is sent. This time 
period is used to allow for a CRT monitor time to retract its beam back to the 
top at the end of a frame and to the left at the end of a line. These are left over 
in the standard for compatibility with CRT display technology.  
The modulation process outlined by the following algorithm (Algorithm 
1), is loosely based on the code from Tempest for Eliza [14]. A modified 
variant was implemented in order to improve quality of the transmitted signal.  
Intuitively, the above algorithm decides which pixel to color by emulating 
the carrier frequency's peaks. The resulting image is made of alternating 
horizontal "stripes" consisting of either a black and white pixel pattern that 
FM signals  (87.5-108MHz)
Audio (~0-44KHz)
Data (text/binary)
1Layer 
2Layer 
3Layer 
Modulations
(AirHopper PC)
Demodulations
(AirHopper Mobile)
FM chip/DSP
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matches the carrier frequency or an empty black stripe. The inner loop 
calculates the pattern that emulates the carrier frequency 𝐹𝑐. The width of the 
stripes, and consequently the number of stripes is determined by the value of 
𝐹𝑑 and calculated in the outer loop. Simply put, this periodic change in stripes 
modulates the audio tone 𝐹𝑑. 
Given a pixel map, the following approximate formula can be used to 
determine the generated signal frequency. 
 
(𝑌1 − 𝑌0)
(𝐻𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑙 + 𝐻𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐)
𝑃𝑐
≈
1
𝐹𝑑
 
 
𝑌0 and 𝑌1 are the vertical pixel coordinates of two consecutive pixel rows 
that have the same pixel pattern. This formula uses the video card timing 
parameters to approximately calculate the period time of the data signal. 
                             
             
Algorithm 1: Pixel map for signal tone (Fd) modulation 
 
4.2  AirHopper Transmitter - Data Modulation over Audio 
 
We used two techniques to modulate digital information over the audio 
signals, Audio Frequency-Shift Keying (A-FSK) and Dual-Tone Multiple-
Frequency (DTMF). Our evaluation shows that A-FSK is less sensitive to 
interferences and can transmit to longer distances compared to DTMF. DTMF 
on the other hand, is more efficient in terms of bandwidth and binary data 
transmissions.  
With both techniques, the data was modulated over audio frequencies. Our 
experiments show that frequencies lower than 600Hz suffered from 
significant interference, and extensive reception testing showed that reception 
distance started to diminish significantly for signal frequencies greater than 
11 kHz. We limited the transmission range accordingly in both methods. 
 
01 k ← 2 * Fd / PC , t ← 0 
02 all pixels ← BLACK 
03   For i ← 0 to Vp 
04     IF floor(t*k)is odd  
05       For j ← 0 to Hp 
06         IF floor(t*k) is odd  
07           pixel[j][i] ← WHITE 
08         t←t+1 
09     Else 
10       t←t+Hp 
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4.2.1 A-FSK. With this data modulation method over audio each letter or 
character was keyed with different audio frequency. Technically, this is done 
by showing an image on the entire screen area to generate a single, unique 
signal frequency, and keeping the image static for a short time span. The 
receiver is then responsible for sampling the demodulated audio signal and 
decoding the data. Using less than 40 distinct audio frequencies, we were able 
to encode simple textual data – both alphabetical and numerical. This method 
is very effective for transmitting short textual massages such as identifiers, 
key-stroking, keep-alive messages and notifications. During our extensive 
testing this method proved to be the most resilient to interference and had the 
greatest reception range and the best accurate data recovery rate. Following 
these positive results, we attempted modulating arbitrary binary data using 
256 different audio tones, resulting in frequency spacing of 11000/256≈40Hz 
per character. Our tests resulted in higher error ratio and ambiguous 
demodulations at the decoder side. The primary reason is that the digital 
signal processing (DSP) component in FM receivers utilizes adaptive noise 
filtering, equalization and other techniques, to enhance the listening 
experience. These methods are altering adjacent audio frequencies, unifying 
them or filtering them as noise. As a result of the above, we adapted DTMF 
modulation to encode binary data. 
 
4.2.2. DTMF(16x16). In the DTMF schema, a combination of two tones 
represents a byte of data. This is similar to using two hexadecimal digits. The 
tones were selected from a table of 16x16 frequency pairs enabling 256 
different combinations. The table's columns are frequencies in the 600Hz-
5000Hz range, and the table's rows are frequencies in the 6000Hz-10400Hz 
range. E.g., a byte containing data equivalent to the value 134 is represented 
by a tone in the eighth row (⌊134/16⌋=8) and a tone in the sixth column (134 
mod 16=6), played simultaneously. The transmission of two modulated audio 
signals is done by logically splitting the screen into two halves, transmitting 
a different image to each half. This resulted in some loss of range and 
reception quality, but the tradeoff was a much higher data transfer rate. 
 
4.3  AirHopper Receiver - Data Demodulation from Audio 
 
An essential part of the malicious code on the mobile phone is the ability 
to record the received FM audio and decode the data or forward the recording 
to the attacker. The important implementation details are described in the next 
sections. 
 
4.3.1 Android FM audio output redirection. In order to process the FM 
audio, its output has to be recorded or saved. Recording output from the FM 
radio was undocumented in Android APIs up to API18 (Android 4.3, Jelly 
Bean MR2). By disassembling the MediaRecorder class file 
(MediaRecorder$AudioSource.smali) from the Android framework, we 
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found how to enable FM radio recording by using AudioRecord object with 
audioSource=8 and sampleRateInHz=44100 [16]. 
 
4.3.2 Audio sampling. Modern mobile phones support a maximum audio 
capture sampling rate of 44.1 KHz. The Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem 
states that perfect reconstruction of a signal is possible, when the sampling 
frequency is greater than twice the maximum frequency of the signal being 
sampled. Consequently, sampling can be accomplished at 20 KHz maximum 
frequency. 20 KHz is the highest frequency generally audible by humans, thus 
making 44.1 KHz the logical choice for most audio material. Using Android’s 
recording API, the radio signals were recorded and stored in a memory buffer, 
using Pulse-Code Modulation (PCM) format at 16 bit per sample. 
 
4.3.3 Signal processing. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) transforms the buffer 
from the time domain to the frequency domain. Since there are 1024 samples 
per chunk, we generate a discrete function that depicts the spectrum of the 
recorded signal, where the amplitude value of each index represents a 
frequency range of 44100/1024≈43Hz. Depending on the modulation method 
(A-FSK or DTMF) - the spectrum is expected to contain one or two distinct 
amplitudes. In DTMF modulation, there should be one frequency index with 
distinctively high amplitude, in each half of the spectrum range (600Hz-
5000Hz and 6000Hz-10400Hz). The frequency index pair is then compared 
to the DTMF frequency table to recover the transmitted byte. 
 
4.3.4 Bypassing headphone requirement. Some phone models require that 
headphones should be connected to enable the user to turn on the radio. This 
is necessary since the headphone cable is being used as an antenna for the FM 
receiver chip. Without an antenna, the reception quality of the FM receiver 
will be poor. While it is technically possible to receive a signal without an 
antenna, the headphone cable requirement ensures a good user experience. 
We found that this limitation is implemented by the vendor at the software 
level, and that it can be bypassed. We disassembled the Samsung Galaxy S3 
framework file (/system/framework/framework2.odx) using baksmali [17] 
disassembler. In the service file (FMRadioService), the mIsHeadsetPlugged 
variable was initialized to 'true', and the headphone check methods 
("access$302), was modified to return 'true'. This tricks the application level 
headphone checks to pass, regardless of the true condition. 
 
4.4  Transmission Protocol 
 
AirHopper employed two modes of transmissions; raw and structured. In 
raw transmissions, the data stream is taken from an array of bytes and 
transmitted sequentially. In case of signal loss or interruptions, the receiver is 
unaware of it. Streaming the raw data sequentially is suitable for textual 
information such as key-logging and text files or for short signaling and 
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notifications messages. Such information is valuable even when some 
characters are missing. The structured protocol is appropriate for binary data 
transmissions when it is important to identify errors and know which part of 
the file or data was actually received. The transmission headers include an (1) 
initial synchronization pulse, (2) the sequence number of the packet, (3) the 
size of the packet, (4) the data itself, and (5) a checksum. AirHopper receiver 
can easily detect which protocol is used (raw of structured) by searching for 
synchronization pulse. 
 
5. Hiding 
 
In order to remain hidden while transmitting, AirHopper uses various 
techniques for hiding both visual aspects and transmitted signal. 
 
5.1  Visual Hiding 
 
This section explains how to eliminate the visual appearance of the 
transmitted data on a computer screen. Three of the suggested techniques 
utilize standardized means of communication with an attached monitor. 
HDMI, DVI and VGA monitors and VDUs implement the Display Data 
Channel (DDC) family of protocols.  
Display Data Channel Command Interface (DDC/CI) itself is a 
bidirectional communication protocol between computer monitor and VDU. 
Monitor Control Command Set (MCCS) is a known standard, developed by 
Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), that specifics the set of 
commands for controlling monitors over the DDC/CI communication 
protocol. 
 
5.1.1 Transmitting when monitor is off. With DDC/CI, the transmitter can 
determine that a monitor is off, and only then start the transmissions. A 
monitor goes off as a result of power-saving settings, when the computer is 
idle for predefined period. As soon as the transmitter detects that the monitor 
is back on, it stops the transmissions. Note that since the VDU constantly 
generates signals, and the monitor cable is used only as an antenna, the 
transmission is just as effective with the monitor turned off. Technically, the 
monitor status is determined by checking Power Control Status (address 
0xe1) of DDC/CI. The transmitter continuously samples this status, polling 
ioctl (I/O control) in a dedicated thread. 0 indicates that the screen is powered 
off. 
 
 
5.1.2 Turning the monitor off. Using DDC/CI, the transmission code can 
also send a command to intentionally turn off the monitor. This method can 
be used in the same manner as a screen-saver; the code monitors the computer 
This is a slightly revised version of the paper accepted by the 9th IEEE International 
Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALCON 2014). 
 
 
11 
 
for user activity and waits for a period of idle time. In case of inactivity, it 
will turn off the monitor and start data transmissions until a user activity, such 
as a mouse movement or keyboard press, is detected. It will then stop 
transmitting and turn the monitor back on, in the same way a normal screen-
saver or power saving feature would behave. Like the previous method, 
turning the monitor on/off is done by writing 1 or 0 to 0xe1, using ioctl. 
 
5.1.3 Switching the monitor to a different computer. Another method for 
hiding the displayed image from users utilizes the popular Keyboard Video 
Mouse (KVM) switch. This switch is a device that allows desktop basic 
peripherals, keyboard mouse and monitor, to be shared between multiple 
computers. By clicking a button on the switch or using a keyboard key 
combination the user switches between desktops. Since this allows the user 
to comfortably use multiple desktops on one office desk, it is commonly used 
in organizations with air-gapped networks. Using DDC/CI, a transmitter can 
detect when the KVM switches between desktops and start/stop the 
transmissions accordingly. 
 
5.1.1 Using secondary display output. Another method that we tested was 
to force the VDU to transmit on a specific video output even though it did not 
detect a connected monitor. This capability can be useful when a computer, 
laptop or desktop, has multiple display outputs. The transmitting code can 
detect which video output is currently being used and redirect the 
transmission to an inactive output. Since in most cases only one display cable 
is connected, and transmitting without a display cable as an antenna requires 
close proximity to the receiver, this method is effective in cases when the user 
places his mobile phone on the desk right next to the laptop/desktop.  
Another scenario is when laptop/desktops are used in conference rooms with 
a secondary persistent connection to a projector. The projector output is 
turned off or disconnected most of the time, allowing for very long 
transmission periods with nothing suspicious being visible. Our testing also 
showed that the long, unshielded cables that are usually used to connect to 
projectors are also ideal for transmission quality and can be received by 
phones in adjacent rooms. 
 
 
5.2  Signal Hiding 
 
Another detection risk is accidental reception of the transmitted signal. 
Since the system that modulates transmitted data uses audible tone 
frequencies, tuning a regular FM receiver to the carrier frequency used for 
transmission, results in a noticeable, changing tone that may alert suspecting 
individuals. In order to reduce the risk of such an accidental detection, we 
extended the phone’s FM reception band to 76 MHz – 108 MHz and the 
transmission carrier frequency to 80MHz.  
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FM transmissions between 76 MHz to 87.5 MHz are only used in very few 
countries, such as Japan. Most FM receivers available elsewhere in the world 
do not allow tuning or seeking in this range. We found, however, that 
although the nonstandard range is actually supported by FM chips in mobile 
phones, the upper software layers disable it. By transmitting in the extended 
range, accidental detection can be avoided in most countries. On the receiving 
phone, we enabled reception of the extended frequency range by modifying 
the Samsung framework utilizing smali [17] disassembler. Technically, the 
framework file is located in /system/framework. We changed the class 
FMRadioService in the package com.android.server by setting the value of 
BAND_76000_108000_kHz to 1. This modification at the OS level code is 
unnoticeable by the phone's user. Using a nonstandard band also helps to 
avoid collisions with local radio station broadcasts, and allows a wider range 
of available transmission frequencies. Another modification that deters 
accidental detection involved changing the phone's frequency seeking 
interval from the default 200 KHz to 50 KHz. This allows the transmitter and 
receiver code to fine-tune to carrier frequencies that many FM receivers will 
not allow for an ordinary user, hence avoiding accidental detection. 
 
6. Evaluation 
 
In this section we evaluate the feasibility and the effectiveness of the 
proposed data exfiltration method. The main efficiency measures include the 
emitted signal strength, the effective broadcasting distance, the transmission 
speed, the transmission quality, the battery consumption, and the scanning 
time. The factors include the cable type, the presence of receiver antenna, the 
modulation method (A-FSK/DTMF), the carrier frequency, the signal delay, 
the transmitted data size, and the range of transmitted frequencies. Further 
explanation of the various efficacy measures and factors, along with 
explanation of their relevance, is provided below, following a short 
description of the experimentation setup. 
 
6.1  Setup 
 
The monitor used was a Samsung SyncMaster SA450. The operating 
system was Ubuntu 13.04 (raring) 64bit, kernel 3.8.0-29-generic. 
The mobile phone was a Samsung GT-I9300 Galaxy S3. The Android 
version was Samsung stock 4.1.2. The baseband version was I9300XXEMC2. 
Kernel version was 3.0.31-1042335. The radio chip was Silicon Labs Si4705 
FM Radio Receiver ICs. We used the standard 1.22 meters (4 ft.) stereo 
headphones that came with the mobile phone. Note that in this mobile phone 
model, the headphones are used as the FM receiver antenna. 
Four types of cables were used to connect the computer with the display 
unit: (I) standard VGA cable, 1.52 meters (5 ft.), 30V, 15-pin male to male; 
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(II) standard VGA cable, 0.91 meters (3 ft.), HD15, male to female, usually 
used as projector extension cable; (III) HDMI cable, 0.91 meters (3 ft.), 30V. 
(IV) DVI cable, 1.82 meters (6 ft.), 30V. Below we refer to these cables as 
standard VGA, extension VGA, HDMI and DVI, respectively. Table 1 
provides relevant classifications of the cable types (i.e. Shielded/Unshielded, 
Analog/Digital). 
 
Table 1: Cable Classification 
Cable Shielding Signal 
std VGA  Shielded Analog 
ext VGA  Unshielded Analog 
HDMI Shielded Digital 
DVI Shielded Digital 
 
6.2  Signal Strength 
 
The strength of the received signal is expected to drop as the distance from 
the transmitter is increased. We measured the Received Signal Strength 
Indication (RSSI) (see Figure 3), as well as the dBm (decibel-milliwatts, 
see Figure 4), across varying distances. RSSI is an indicator of signal quality 
usually exposed by a chip's API. The RSSI scale is arbitrarily selected by the 
manufacturer (Broadcom in the case of the tested mobile phone) and is 
usually a logarithmic scale related to the peak voltage of the received signal. 
dBm is also a logarithmic scale based on the power of the received signal in 
reference to one milliwatt (power is affected by both voltage and current). 
The RSSI measurement was performed by calling the getCurrentRSSI 
function of IFMPlayer, an internal Samsung service used by the FM radio 
player. dBm values were measured with an external spectrum analyzer.   
The RSSI measurements appear to be correlated with the effective distance, 
where a measured value of 10 on the RSSI scale roughly indicates the limit 
of the effective distance on each of the tested cables. 
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Figure 3 :  Signal strength at varying distances (RSSI), using A-FSK. 
(Measured by mobile-phone FM receiver) 
 
 
 
Figure 4 : Signal strength at varying distances (dBm), using A-FSK. 
(Measured by an external spectrum analyzer) 
 
6.3  Effective Distance 
 
The effective distance is the maximal distance between the transmitter and 
the receiver, at which the transmission quality is still acceptable. As can be 
seen in Figure 5, the effective distance when using the receiver antenna is 
significantly larger with unshielded cable (extended VGA), compared to the 
shielded cables (HDMI and standard VGA). To summarize, with both cable 
types, the effective distance when the receiver antenna is present is in the 
order of 8-20 meters, which can be considered as useful for our purposes. 
Some new models of mobile phones are equipped with built-in FM 
antenna, which voids the need for headphones. 
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Figure 5: Signal strength at varying distances, RSSI, using A-FSK 
6.4  Data Modulation Method 
 
The signaling method, i.e. A-FSK or DTMF also affects the effective 
distance. As can be seen in Figure 6 A-FSK yields a slightly larger effective 
distance. 
 
Figure 6: Effective distance with varying cable types, with receiver antenna, 
using A-FSK and DTMF 
 
6.5  Transmission Quality 
 
The transmission quality (also referred to as the 'success rate') is defined as 
the rate of correctly received bytes per originally transmitted bytes. The rate 
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was measured against varying signal delays, i.e. the time interval (in 
milliseconds) assigned for transmitting one byte of data.  
As can be seen in Figure 7, the correlation between the transmission quality 
and the signal delay is logarithmic, asymptotically approaching 100%. 
Beyond a signal delay of 70ms, the additional transmission quality seems 
negligible. 
Settling on 70ms seems reasonable, since a higher delay would result in 
slower transmission which does not yield significant improvement in the 
transmission quality. 
 
Figure 7: Transmission quality at varying signal delays, using DTMF. 
 
As shown in Table 2, the transmission quality (or success rate) was 
measured for each cable type, over varying distances. The signal delay was 
70 ms, which is the optimal value. The measurements are shown for 0.3 m, 
for 6.2 m, and for the maximal distance at which the transmission quality was 
acceptable (or the effective distance). As can be seen, the maximal distance 
has different values for various cable types. 
The values in Table 2 reflect the behavior of the transmission quality, 
which retains an almost fixed high value over an increasing distance, until it 
hits the maximal distance (which varies among the cable types). 
 
Table 2: Transmission quality over varying distance 
using DTMF 
Cable type Transmission quality (%) Max distance 
(meters) At 0.3 m At 6.2 m At max 
Std VGA 99.86 99.27 97.73 7 
Ext VGA 99.88 99.37 99.07 22.2 
HDMI 99.21 99.27 99.61 6.8 
DVI 99.5 99 99 6.8 
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6.6  Data Size 
 
Effective exfiltration of data places practical limits on the transmission 
time. The transmitting program, running on the compromised computer, 
should hide its activities and has limited safe time intervals where the 
collected data can be broadcasted. Additionally, a receiving mobile phone 
does not stay within the effective range of the transmitter for indefinite time. 
In Table 3 we show the transmission time of various types of files, with 
typical sizes, when using raw data and when using structured packets (as 
described in the 'Implementation' section). A 70ms delay was found to be 
optimal. The time required for transmitting tiny-size data (below 100 bytes) 
such as IP & MAC, or password, is below ten seconds, which seems 
acceptable. Small-size data (below 10 KB) such as system-information or 
one-day keylogging would require several minutes, which also seems 
acceptable. However, documents in the order of 0.5 MB would take several 
hours to transmit and this would seem to be unacceptable. Note that the toll 
inflicted by using structured packets compared to raw data seems to be 
tolerable, and justifies using this method when accurate reception is required. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Transmission time with varying data size (70ms delay) 
File (data size) Raw data Structured 
packets 
IP & MAC (10 bytes) <1 sec 1 sec 
Password file (100 bytes) 8 sec 10 sec 
1 hour keylogging (1 KB) 77 sec 106 sec 
System information (2 KB) 153 sec 211 sec 
1 day keylogging (8 KB) 10.25 min 14.1 min 
Document (0.5MB) 10.9 hour 15 hour 
 
 
 
7. Countermeasures 
 
    Defensive countermeasures for general Tempest threats can be categorized 
into technical vs. procedural. Countermeasures of the technical kind include 
(a) physical insulation, (b) software-based reduction of information-bearing 
emission, and (c) early encryption of signals. Procedural countermeasures 
include official practices and standards, along with legal or organizational 
sanctions. The relevant American and NATO standards, concerning Tempest, 
were held highly classified throughout the Cold War. Some of the standards 
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eventually leaked or were released but are severely redacted [18] while more 
informative documents, in particular those concerning defensive 
countermeasures, are still classified. The prevailing standards aim at limiting 
the level of detectable information-bearing RF signals over a given distance 
on open air, or its equivalent when insulating materials are used. In effect, 
certified equipment is classified by 'zones' which refer to the perimeter that 
needs to be controlled to prevent signal reception [19]. As a countermeasure 
against attacks like the one in this research the ‘zones’ approach should be 
used to define the physical areas inside the organization, in which carrying a 
mobile phone or other radio receivers is prohibited. Another countermeasure 
is ensuring that only properly shielded cables are used. Shielding affects the 
effective range as shown by our experiments.   
 
8. Related Work 
 
Anderson [19] provides a highly informative review of emission or 
emanation security (Emsec): preventing attacks which use compromising 
emanations (CE) consisting of either conducted or radiated electromagnetic 
signals. In 1985, van Eck [11] demonstrated how Tempest exploits can be 
produced with rather ordinary equipment and skills. Using a modified TV set, 
he managed to reconstruct an image from electromagnetic signals produced 
by Video Display Unit (VDU) at a considerable distance. During the second 
half of the 1990s, several researches and publications related to Tempest were 
released [12] [13], spurring increased public interest. This trend was 
amplified by the Web which has offered a glimpse into classified official 
standards related to Tempest [18], or provided detailed instructions and 
tutorials related to Tempest exploits [14]. Kuhn and Anderson [12] [13] 
demonstrated that many of the compromising emanations from a PC can be 
manipulated by suitable software, in either a defensive or offensive manner. 
Thiele [14] [20] offers an open source program dubbed 'Tempest for Eliza', 
that uses the computer monitor to send out AM radio signals. The generated 
music can then be heard on one’s radio. Kania [15] provides a collection of 
programs for generating FM radio signals in software, and then transmitting 
them using a VGA graphics card. In our implementation, we used different 
technique to generate FM signals in order to improve the signals quality.   
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Exfiltration of data from air-gapped networks is not a trivial task. However, 
in this paper we introduce AirHopper, a bifurcated attack pattern by which 
this challenging task can be accomplished. The core of the method consists 
of two essential elements: (a) electromagnetic signals emitted from a 
computer's monitor cable, with data intentionally modulated on those signals, 
and (b) an FM receiver on a mobile phone that can collect the transmitted 
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signals, and extract the modulated data. The chain of attack is rather 
complicated, but is not beyond the level of skill and effort employed in 
modern Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). Evaluation of the proposed 
method includes experimental measurements of various measures such as the 
effective transmitting distance, cable type, the presence of receiver antenna, 
etc. 
AirHopper adds to an understanding of electromagnetic emission threats, 
coupled with APT techniques. This research area is not sufficiently covered 
in recent academic literature. We believe that a careful professional and 
academic discussion of this threat, ultimately serves the interest of the cyber-
defense community. 
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